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A key idea in political economy is that policy is often tailored to voters who are not ideologically attached
- swing voters. We show, however, that in political environments where political parties can use repression
and violence to exclude voters from elections, they may optimally target the swing voters. This is because
they anticipate that if they had to compete for the support of these voters, they would end up giving
them a lot of policy favors. Hence in weakly institutionalized political environments swing voters





N309, 1737 Cambridge Street









A central idea in political economy is that voters who are not ideologically
attached to a political party, so-called ￿ swing voters,￿attract policy favors
and redistribution because they become the focus of electoral competition.
In many parts of the world, however, politicians do not just use carrots to win
elections, they also use sticks - coercion and violence. In this paper we show
that expanding the ￿ policy space￿to incorporate this can completely overturn
the predictions of the standard model. The reason for this is simple, with all
groups of voters at play, political competition does indeed lead to a chase for
the support of swing voters. In equilibrium this enables such voters to extract
a large amount of rent from politicians. Anticipating this, politicians have an
incentive to use violence to e⁄ectively disenfranchise swing voters. Indeed,
and surprisingly, we show that it can be more attractive for an incumbent to
disenfranchise the swing voters than the core supporters of the opposition.
Swing voters are not blessed but cursed.1
Are these ideas of only theoretical interest? We believe not. Since coming
to power in Zimbabwe in 1980, Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party has
contested and won elections which feature both policy favors, such as land
reform, and coercion. As Joseph Kuratidzi, an opposition activist noted after
the last election in Zimbabwe, ￿Mugabe said he would never give up power.
It was a mistake to think a vote could change that. When you vote you let
him know who to kill.￿ 2
Case study evidence is consistent with the view that much of this violence
was aimed not at the core supporters of Mugabe￿ s opposition, but rather at
the swing voters. Already in the election campaigns following independence
in 1980 violence was widespread. Laakso (1999, p. 45), referring from the
report of the Election Commissioner, notes that
￿In areas where people were highly committed to one party,
as in Matabeleland and much of Mashonaland, allegations of in-
timidation were not as frequent. Instead, Victoria Province, part
of the Midlands and part of Manicaland, where both liberation
1Our paper therefore presents a di⁄erent notion of ￿ curse￿than the one formalized by
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996).
2Guardian Weekly, 27/06/08, p. 12.
1parties had ground, were said to be the areas of most serious
intimidation.￿
During the 1990s the Movement for Democratic Change emerged as the
main opposition party, and in the 2000 parliamentary elections was seriously
threatening Zanu-PF￿ s position. Meredith (2002, p. 215) reports that
￿The most ￿ercely contested was a by-election in Bikita West,
a rural constituency that MDC had narrowly won in the general
election and that Zanu-PF was determined to wrest back ... Zanu-
PF militias set up camps around the constituency, beating up
people, forcing them to attend rallies, and con￿scated identity
cards they needed in order to vote.￿
In 2005 Operation Murambatsvina (OM) (literally in Chishona ￿ Opera-
tion Drive out Rubbish￿ ) was launched by the government. This was a na-
tionwide policy of repression analyzed by Bratton and Masunungure (2006)
using survey data collected by the Afrobarometer. They show that (pp.
35-36) OM ￿caught supporters of the ruling party as well as its opponents.
While opposition individuals or blocs may have been singled out, an equally
plausible story allows that the security apparatus cracked down on any young
unemployed - or underemployed, or informally employed - person who was a
potential recruit for anti-state protest.￿In our view it is exactly these same
people who may constitute the swing voters in current Zimbabwe.
2 A model
We consider a society with three groups of potential voters, where one voter
group is less ideological than the other voter groups. We call this group
swing voters, while we term the other groups ideological voters. In turn,
among the ideological voter groups, one group has a majority of voters with
an ideological bias in favor of the incumbent politician A, while the other
group has a majority of voters in favor of the opposition politician B. Each
voter group consists of a continuum of agents normalized to unity, thus the
total number of voters equals 3. A voter j has an ideological bias ￿
j toward
the incumbent politician A. In the the swing voters￿group, which we term
2group S, ￿
j is uniformly distributed on the interval [￿ 1
2￿h; 1
2￿h] with density
￿h. In the group of ideological voters that favor politician A, which we term
group A, ￿





h, while in the group of ideological voters that favor politician B, which
we term group B, ￿





density h. As swing voters care less about ideology than ideological voters
￿ > 1, and the higher is ￿ the less relatively ideological the swing voters
are. Furthermore, among group A voters a share ￿ has an ideological bias in
favor of politician A while among group B voters a share ￿ has an ideological
bias in favor of politician B. Thus ￿ > 1
2. Each individual is also subject to
an aggregate shock in favor of politician A, denoted  , which is a random
variable uniformly distributed on the interval [￿ 1
2￿; 1
2￿] with density ￿ > 0.
By holding power politicians receive some exogenous gross rents R. We
denote the income transfer to a voter in group i 2 fS;A;Bg from politician
k 2 fA;Bg by yi
k ￿ 0. In addition to using transfers to attract support we
assume that the incumbent, A, controlling the police and state apparatus,
may choose to use repression and violence to exclude one group of the voters
from the election at cost C. The incumbent then must decide (i) if to use
violence and repression and (ii) in case which group this should be targeted.
Thus we basically employ a probabilistic voting model based on Lindbeck
and Weibull (1987) extended to allow the possibility that the incumbent can
disenfranchise a group of voters.
Citizens attempt to maximize their utility which is the sum of consump-
tion and ideology. Politicians attempt to maximize the expected value of
their rents minus repression cost.
2.1 Political support






B ￿  :
If the opposite is the case the voter supports the opposition politician B.






















































B +  
￿
:
2.2 Free and fair elections
Consider ￿rst the case where the incumbent chooses not to use violence and
repression. In this case all agents vote, and the probability the incumbent is














which can be shown to be
￿ = Pr
(






























The incumbents￿expected rents in the case where he decides to run free















that maximizes his expected









it follows that the solution to
this maximization problem involves yA
A = yB
A = 0, and incorporating that
politician B will also give transfers to swing voters only (see below), the




















The left hand side is the expected bene￿t of increasing transfers to swing vot-






by the increase in the re-election probability
￿￿
2+￿ by giving more transfers.
The right hand side is the expected cost of giving more transfers - it simply
equals the reelection probability since this is the probability the incumbent
has to pay transfers after the election.















. The solution to this
problem involves yA
B = yB





























In turn this implies a reelection probability for the incumbent given by ￿ =
1
2, and expected rents with optimally chosen transfers under free and fair






Thus in this case policy is completely tailored to the swing voters - ideolog-
ical groups get no transfers. The higher is ￿, that is the less ideologically
attached the swing voters are relative to the rest of the population, the lower
are expected political rents. A high ￿ means that the marginal e⁄ect on the
election probability of increasing transfers to swing voters is high, in turn
making political competition sti⁄, increasing transfers to voters and decreas-
ing the rents of the politicians. Furthermore, the higher is ￿, the lower are
the expected political rents.
If the incumbent chooses to include violence and repression as part of his
political strategy, he may target the swing voters￿group S or he may target
the ideological group B with a majority of voters with an ideological bias in
favor of the opposition (it can easily be shown that he will never direct the
violence and repression towards the voters with an ideological bias in favor
of himself). We consider these cases in turn.
2.3 Violence against swing voters
Denote the reelection probability of the incumbent when the he decides to
use violence and repression to exclude the swing voters from the election by




















5His expected rents in the case where the incumbent disenfranchises the swing







￿ C. The incumbent







that maximizes his expected




< 0 it follows that the solution to this
maximization problem involves yS

































































We still have policy convergence (in the transfers dimension) in the sense
that the total amount of transfers given by the two politicians is the same
- the distribution of transfers between the two ideological groups does not
matter for the election result nor the expected rents of politicians. In turn
the reelection probability for the incumbent is again given by ￿S￿ = 1
2 and






By comparing (3) and (6) we can then ￿nd that a strategy of violence and






At ￿rst sight one may think that if the use of violence and repression were
costless then it would always pay to disenfranchise the swing voters since
this reduces political competition. However, this is not the case. The nat-
ural measure of political competition in our model is the derivative of the
6election probability with respect to transfers. Under free and fair elections
this measure of political competition is given by
￿￿
2+￿, while with repression
against the swing voters it is given by
￿
2. Disenfranchising the swing voters
has two opposing e⁄ects on the extent of electoral competition. First, elim-
inating the most responsive voters decreases political competition as now
politicians compete for less responsive voters. Second, however, with fewer
voters the marginal e⁄ect on the reelection probability of capturing each
voter increases, making political competition stronger. The former e⁄ect
dominates when ￿ > 2, while the latter dominates if the opposite is the case.
Thus if swing voters are not very di⁄erent from ideological voters it is not
optimal to disenfranchise them even if this is costless, such disenfranchising
will only result in increased political competition and increased transfers to
voters. We note that given ￿ > 2 the strategy of disenfranchising swing vot-
ers is more likely to dominate a strategy of free and fair elections the higher
is ￿, the higher is ￿, and the lower is C.
A standard result in models of political competition is that when voters
care more economic factors relative to other characteristics of the candidates,
then electoral competition is e¢ cient in the sense that transfers to voters are
high and rents to politicians low, see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000). By
contrast, in our model this is exactly the situation where violence becomes
relatively attractive as a means to reduce transfers to voters and increase
political rents.
2.4 Violence against opposition supporters
In the remainder we assume that (7) is ful￿lled so that free and fair elections
will not emerge in equilibrium. However this may not imply that swing voters
are cursed, as the incumbent must consider the alternative violent strategy
of targeting the supporters of the opposition. Thus consider ￿nally the case
where the incumbent chooses to disenfranchise the ideological group B that
has a bias in favor of his opponent. Denote his reelection probability in this








































< 0 it follows that the solution to the incum-
bents maximization problem involves yB








it follows that yA





















































From (8) and (9) we then ￿nd the Nash equilibrium
y
S


















Thus in this case we do not have policy convergence - by eliminating the
core supporters of his opponent the incumbent shifts the electorate towards
voters viewing himself more favorably. In turn this increases his election
probability, making the expected cost of transfers for him higher and for the
opposition lower. This makes the incumbent choose less transfers to voters
than his opponent, although naturally this e⁄ect cannot be su¢ ciently strong
to outweigh the electoral advantage the incumbent has in the ￿rst place. The

























Comparing (6) and (10) we ￿nd that a strategy of using violence and repres-
sion to disenfranchise swing voters rather than the ideological voters of the
8opposition is more likely (i) the lower is ￿, (ii) the higher is ￿, (iii) the higher
is h, and (iv) the lower is ￿.
A low ￿ means that core voters are not very attached to their politician.
This implies that there is not much of an electoral advantage to be gained
by disenfranchising them, and a strategy of disenfranchising swing voters
instead becomes relatively more attractive.
A high ￿ makes it relatively costly to have swing voters participating in
the election compared to other voters because one ends up giving them a lot
of policy favors. Then it is relatively more attractive to repress the swing
voters.
A high h, meaning that there are few ideological hardliners in the pop-
ulation as a whole, makes it relatively more attractive to target the swing
voters. The intuition for this is that a strategy of disenfranchising ideological
voters of the opposition is relatively less politically valuable if the remaining
ideological voters are not very faithful to the incumbent and if the ones one
targeted where not very faithful to the opponent. Thus when ideological
heterogeneity is low targeting swing voters is relatively more attractive.
Finally, strong political competition in the form of a low ￿ makes targeting
swing voters relatively more attractive because when electoral competition
is sti⁄, there is relatively less to gain by disenfranchising ideological voters.
3 Concluding remarks
In many elections in ￿ weakly institutionalized polities￿(to use the terminology
of Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier, 2004) elections involve not just policies,
but violence and coercion. In this paper we have shown that changing the
probabilistic voting model in a simple way to allow incumbents repress groups
of voters may turn the result that policy is tailored to swing voters on its
head. It is precisely because politicians compete for the support of swing
voters that it is attractive to use violence to eliminate them from the game.
Moreover, the easier the swing voters swing, the harder they fall.
94 References
Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier (2004)
￿Kleptocracy and Divide-and-rule: A Model of Personal Rule,￿Journal of
the European Economic Association, 2, 162-192.
Bratton, Michael and Eldred Masunungure (2006) ￿Popular Reac-
tions to Sate Repression: Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe,￿African
A⁄airs, 106/422, 21-45.
Feddersen, Timothy J. and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1996) ￿The
Swing Voter￿ s Curse,￿American Economic Review, 86, 408-424.
Laakso, Liisa (1999) Voting Without Choosing: State Making and Elec-
tions in Zimbabwe, Acta Politica No. 11, University of Helsinki.
Lindbeck, Assar and Jłrgen Weibull (1987) ￿Balanced-budget Re-
distribution as the Outcome of Political Competition,￿ Public Choice, 52,
273-297.
Meredith, Martin (2002) Mugabe. Power and Plunder in Zimbabwe,
New York: Public A⁄airs.
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000) Political Economics:
Explaining Economic Policy, Cambridge: MIT Press.
10